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blood-stains, on muslin and linen cloth, after at least a year's exposure, with entire success, and inquired of Prof. Wormley whether he
had ever detected any difference in the size of blood corpuscles
soaked out from stains on linen, wood, &c., and those from spots
on paper or glass.
"Prof. Wormley replied that he had not found any variation in
corpuscles from blood-stains dried on a great variety of objects, and
kinds of fabrics."
Dr. Richardson says, in London Microscopical Journal for Sept.
1874: "The experience of Prof. Leidy and Prof. Wormley accords
with mine, in that they have never seen the drying or remoistening
of red blood corpuscles cause them to expand. From this it would
seem to follow, that the expression, ' restore the corpuscles,' is used
incorrectly, as there can be no restoration other than the bringing
of them back to their normal size. This, also, goes to prove what
I have said before on this point."
As it regards the unchangeableness of blood corpuscles through
lapse of time, Dr. Richardson says in this same paper, that blood
spots, which he had examined five years previous, gave corpuscles
unchanged in size.
R. U. PI.PER.
Chicago, June 1880.
(To be continted.)
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Court of Appeal (from -Exchequer Division).
LEIGH v. JACK.
The plaintiff's testator conveyed to the defendant, or his predecessors in title, two
pieces of land adjoining a strip of land intended by the testator for a highway. For
more than twenty years before action, the defendant made some use of the strip
of land for business purposes. Within twenty years, both the plaintiff or the plaintiff's testator and the defendant had repaired some railings separating the strip
of land from an adjoining highway, and within twenty years the defendant had first
enclosed a portion and afterwards fenced it in at either end. In an action to recover
possession of the strip of land, held (affirming the decision of the Exchequer Division), that the presumption that the soil to the middle of a highway belongs to the
owner of the adjoining land, does not arise where such land adjoins an intended
highway never dedicated to the public. Held, also, that the plaintiff had not been
dispossessed by the defendant, nor had the plaintiff discontinued possession within
section 3 of the Statute of Limitations.
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APPEAL from the Exchequer Division on a special case
stated by
an arbitrator in an action for recovery of land. The following
are
the material pas of the special case:
The action was brought to recover possession of a piece of land
situate in Kirkdale, in the borough of Liverpool. Part
of the
piece of land was described as Grundy street and the residue
as
Napier place. The piece of land, together with land adjoining
thereto on the north and south, was in the occupation of
the
defendant. The plaintiff was tenant for life under the will of
John
Gerrard Leigh, deceased, of all the lands of which one John
Shaw
Leigh died seised.
In 1854, John Shaw Leigh being seised in fee of a piece of land
marked B 1854 on the plan annexed to the special case, as well
as
of the piece of land in respect of which this action was brought,
and of other land adjoining and now in the occupation
of the
defendant, by deed dated the 1st of December 1854, conveyed
to
the defendant the piece of land marked B 1854 in fee, subject
to a
ground-rent secured by powers of distress and re-entry.
The
piece of land conveyed by the deed was thus described therein:
"All that piece of land situate, lying and being in the township
of Kirkdale, within the borough of Liverpool, in the county
of
Lancaster, and on the east side of Regent road, south side of Grandy
street and west side of Napier place, in the Victoria road in
Liverpool aforesaid, bounded on the north by Grundy street, on the
east
by Napier place, on the south in part by land formerly of the
said
John Shaw Leigh, but now belonging to the Lancashire and
Yorkshire Railway Company, and in the remaining part by land
lately
conveyed by the said John Shaw Leigh to the said James Jack,
on
which the said James Jack hath erected an iron foundry and
other
buildings, and on the west by Regent road aforesaid, and
which
said piece of land intended to be hereby granted * * * contains
in the whole 4259 square yards of land * * *
The 4259 square yards were the total contents of the land south
of Grundy street, and did not include any portion of the site
of that
street.
On the 19th of March 1857, John Shaw Leigh by deed conveyed
to the Mersey Dock Trustees, the piece of land marked C
1872,
lying to the north of the piece of land called Grundy street.
The
total contents did not include any portion of the site of Grundy
street. On the 13th of March 1872, the last-mentioned piece
of
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land was by deed conveyed by the Mersey Dock Trustees to the
defendant.
Grundy street and Napier place were names used to describe
certain portions of waste land belonging to John Shaw Leigh, and
which he had at one time contemplated dedicating to the public as
streets, and they were marked as streets on a plan of that portion
of the Leigh Estates, which John Shaw Leigh caused to be prepared and hung up in the Leigh estate office, with a view to the
sale or lease of portions of the estate for building.
Grundy street and Napier place were never in fact used by the
public as highways. Save as hereinbefore is stated, John Shaw
Leigh never dedicated Grundy street or Napier place to the public.
Up to the time of the enclosing of Grundy street by the defendant,
hereinafter mentioned, Grundy street was separated from Regent
road by a fence consisting of posts and a swing rail. This fence
was repaired and renewed both by John Shaw Leigh and by the
defendant within the twenty years next before this action and after
the purchase by the Dock Board.
Immediately after the conveyance to the defendant of the piece
of land marked B 1854, the defendant caused a rough post and
rail fence to be put along the northern boundary of Grundy street,
for t e purpose of defining the boundary.
Immediately after the conveyance in 1857 to the Dock Board
Trustees of the piece of land marked C 1872, such trustees caused
a substantial post and rail fence to be erected along the northern
boundary of Grundy street.
In 1854, on taking the conveyance of that date of the piece of
land marked B 1854, the defendant erected a foundry and ironworks along the northern boundary of Grundy street, with windows
looking out into that street and Napier place, and a gateway leading intoNapier place. From the time of taking the conveyance
down to the date of the enclosure of Grundy street and Napier
place, hereinafter mentioned, the defendant, by placing a quantity
of old graving dock materials, screw propellers, and boilers, and
refuse fiom his foundry over the surface of Grundy street and Napier place, rendered them impassable for carts and horses. Persons on foot, however, did occasionally, down to that date, pass
along Grundy street from Victoria road to Regent road.
In 1865, the defendant enclosed an oblong piece of Grundy
street.
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Tn 1872, the defendant completely enclosed the pieces of land
called Grundy street and Napier place, on the west and east sides
respectively.
No complaint was made on behalf of the Leigh family with
respect to any of the said acts of the defendant until 1875.
This action was commenced the 1st of April 1876.
The arbitrator, if and so far as it was a question of fact, found
that the defendant did not acquire a title by possession and user
only to any portion of the land.
The Exchequer Division gave judgment for the plaintiff. The
defendant appealed.
C. Russell, Q. C., and W. Butler, for the defendant.-By virtue
of the conveyances, the soil of Grundy street, usque ad medium
filum vice. is vested in the defendant. That presumption applies,
for the plaintiff has not rebutted it, and he did not reserve to himself the property in the soil of the road: Simpson v. Dendy, 8 C.
B. N. S. 433; Berridge v. Ward, 10 Id. 400; Holmes v. Bellingham, 7 Id. 329. This case is to be distinguished from The Plumstead Board of Works v. The British Land Company, Law Rep.
10 Q. B. 16, for there the conveyances showed an intention to
exclude the soil of the road from passing. See also The Marqui8
of Salisbury v. The Great ANorthern Railway Company, 5 0. B.
N. S. 174. Even if the soil of Grundy street has not vested in
the defendant by virtue of the conveyances, he has acquired a title
by possession for more than twenty years next before action, and
the plaintiff, therefore, is barred by the Statute of Limitations, as
he has been dispossessed or has discontinued possession for that
period of time.
Herschell, Q. 0., Gully, Q. C., and A. L. Smith, for the plaintiff, were stopped by the court.
CCCKBURN,

C. J.-I

am of opinion this judgment must be

affirmed; for, looking at the conveyances by which the property
in question has passed, I think the presumption of law does not
arise in this case. The presumption is that in the case of a highway, the ownership of the soil, ad medium filum via, is in the
adjoining landowners, and it is founded on the assumption that in
making a road for public convenience, a sacrifice was made by the
adjoining owners of a portion of their land for public purposes. It
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is a presumption of law founded on reasonable probability, and is a
very useful rule where it is uncertain in whom the ownership of the
soil is vested. But I think the presumption does not arise where,
as on this case, we have a modern grant or conveyance which speaks
for itself, for then there is no difficulty as to the ownership of the
soil of the road. There is, therefore, no reason for making the
presumption in this case, and I do not think the grantor intended
te divest himself of the soil of that piece of land, which was then
waste land.
The defendant, however, relies also on the Statute of Limitations.
It is argued that the plaintiff and her predecessors have been dispossessed of the profits of this land for twenty years, and therefore
the plaintiff's claim is barred. It is not alleged that the plaintiff
has been dispossessed by anything, unless it be by the acts of the
defendant. That was a question of fact for the arbitrator; he
decided that they did not amount to dispossession of the plaintiff,
and I think his finding was 'quite right. Nor did the plaintiff discontinue possession. It was the intention of the owner of the land
to make a street, and to dedicate part of this land to the public, and
the acts done by the defendant were not done to defeat that intention. ' The acts of the defendant were simply the acts of a man
who did not intend to be a trespasser, and who used the land
meanwhile for his own purposes, until the owner should put it to
the use contemplated by both parties. I apprehend a person does
not necessarily discontinue possession of land because he does not
actually use it himself or by his agent. I am of opinion, therefore,
that there has been in this case no dispossession or discontinuance
of possession, and therefore our judgment should be for the plaintiff, and the appeal dismissed.
L. J.-I am of the same opinion. The first question for us to consider is, what passed by these conveyances ? To
ascertain the intention of a document, it is necessary to look at the
surrounding facts. The rule is, that if I convey an estate which is
bounded by roads, then that grant would pass these roads vsque
ad medium filum vioe.
Now let us take this case. When these conveyances were executed there was no street in existence, and I see no reason for supposing that the grantor intended to convey half of the soil over
which he contemplated making a street. Surely he might make
BRAM'WELL,
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the street wider or narrower than at the time of the grant he
proposed to do; but if the property in the soil passed by this
grant,
then the grantor could have been prevented by the grantee
from
making the road, and he would not have been able to dedicate
it to
the public at all. I do not think this can be the case; and I
think
the grant to the defendant did not include the land ad medium
filum vite. I have had a misgiving as to the northern half
of the
intended street; but I think the reason of the thing is to hold
that
the presumption of law already referred to does not apply, and
that
the property granted is described by metes and bounds. If
in both
conveyances the words had been "intended street," could
it have
been said that the plaintiff intended to grant away the soil, and
that
he could be prevented from making the street? I think not;
and
I am of opinion that the Dock Trustees and the defendant did
not
get the soil ad medium filum vim of the land in question.
As to the Statute of Limitations, I think the statute contemplated two cases. First, where a man has been dispossessed
by a
tortious act. Second, where he has discontinued possession.
It is
difficult to suppose a case of complete discontinuance of possession
of a house, for a very little would be sufficient to show continuance
of possession. But there are conceivable cases of discontinuance,
as, for instance, in the case of a definite field, an outlying
piece
of land: a man might keep out of it and do nothing to
it for
twenty years, and so discontinue possession. The plaintiff
might
have done so here; he might never have repaired the fence,
never
have offered to let, nor gone near the place by himself or any
agent;
then, I think, he would have discontinued possession; but
it is a
question of fact, and difficult to establish against an owner of
land.
The arbitrator seems to me to have said that if it was a question
of fact for him, then he found the plaintiff had not discontinued
possession. The arbitrator found no dispossession and no
discontinuance. I do not think he is wrong; it is necessary that
the
defendant should show dispossession or discontinuance of possession;
acts of trespass by the defendant are not enough. However,
it is
stated in evidence that the plaintiff repaired a fence within
twenty
years, and that is sufficient to show that he has not discontinued
possession. The arbitrator has found the defendant has not
sQ
(lealt with the land as practically to evict the plaintiff; there
has,
therefore, been no dispossession. I think that the plaintiff
is
entitled to our judgment.
VOL. XXVIII.- 69
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COTTON, L. J.-As neither of the two conveyances purports in
terms to convey the land in question to the defendant, he is compelled to rely on a presumption of law to pass the soil of Grundy
street. Where there has been a conveyance of property adjoining
a highway, then the presumption, usque ad medium filum vice,
arises, for the presumption applies to roads existing at the time.
But no case has been shown in which a conveyance of land adjoining something which it is intended to make into a road at some
future time, has been held to pass the right to have the soil of that
road when it shall be made. The question, therefore, is, whether
or no the presumption arises with reference to a road intended to
be a highway. In such a case the owner still retains over the land
his rights, which have not been diminished in any way by any
public rights acquired through the land being dedicated to the
public. The presumption is of law only, and can be rebutted;
and in such a case as the present many circumstances must exist to
establish the presumption. I am of opinion that it does not arise
where there is only an intention to dedicate a street to the public,

and there is no existing highway. I do not think the case of the
land which passed by the second conveyance is really different. I
am of opinion the presumption could not arise in respect of that
land, and I decide the case on the ground that there was no existing highway at the time of the conveyance.
As to the Statute of Limitations, we have the finding of the
arbitrator that the plaintiff was not dispossessed, and I am unable
to discover any facts amounting to dispossession of the plaintiff by
the acts of the defendant. Nor do I think the plaintiff has discontinued possession. It is not necessary that an owner should actually
be in possession in person: though absent, he may still be in possession in the eye of the law. We must look at the nature and
condition of the property. If that is done here, the conclusion
come to is, that the acts of the defendant did not oust the plaintiff,
and that the plaintiff has not himself discontinued possession.
Therefore the defendant fails on both points.
Judgment affirmed.
In America, aiso, it is familiar law,
that a deed of land, bounded "on,"
" upon," "by" or "along" an existing
public highway, primafacie conveys the
fee to the middle of the road. The rnle
is too -well settled to need the citation of

authorities, it being of course limited to
cases where the grantor owns the fee of
the road and has a right to convey it :
Dunham v. Williams, 36 M. Y. 251.
And this rule applies to deeds of city
lots as well as to country farms: Ham-
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mend v. JicLachlan, I Sandf. 323;
any portion of the highway, such as "by
Bissell v. New York Cntral Railroad tile side of the highway, &c. :"
TyS.er v.
Co., 23 N. Y. 61. And although the Hammond, 11 Pick.
193; Jackson v.
way be so ancient that its origin is un- Hathaway,
15 Johns. 447; Sibley v.
known: Rice v. Worcester, 11 Gray
Bolden, 10 Pick. 249; Sraith v.,Sloomb,
2S3, note.
11 Gray 280; Sizer v. Devereux, 16
It applies to deeds bounded on a rail- Barb. 160 ; Ifuqhes v. Providence4- Worroad, the fee of the bed of which is in cester Railroad Co.,
2 R. I. 508; Itobothe grantor; Maynard v. IVeeks, 41 Vt. ken Land 4- Improvement Co. v. Kerri617. And some think it applies to land gan, 2 Vroom
13; Brainard v. Boston
bounr led "on a park." See Perrin v. 6. N. Y. Central Railroad
Co., 12 Gray
Nw York Central Railroad Co., 36 N. 407 ; Buck v. Squires, 22 Vt.
484 ;
Y. 120. Sod qutcre.
Cattle v. Young, 59 Me. 105; Marquis
The general rule also applies to deeds of .alisbury
v. Great Northern Railway
bounding on a private way, lane or alley, Co., 5 C. B.
(N. S.) 174; Plunpstead
the half of which belongs to the grantor:
Board of Works v. British Land Co.,
Fih,r v. Smith, 9 Gray 441 ; Sinpson Law. Rep.,
10 Q. 3. 16.
v. Dendy, 8 C. B. (N. 5.) 433; Holmes
Not unlikely some conflict may be
Y. Jiedingham, 7 Id. 329.
found in the adjudicated cases in the
And by the "centre of the road," in application of these rules;
but all agree
such a case, is ordinarily meant the cen- that the question is one of
construction
tre of the travdled path or actual road, in each particular
case, depending upon
and not merely the centre of the located the intention of the parties,
as expressed
or legal way, if they differ; so that in in the
descriptive parts of the deed,
some cases, where the travelled path is
explained and illustrated by all the other
at one side of the located road, the gran- parts of the conveyance,
and by the
tor might retain more or less than one- localities to which it applies.
See Codhalf of the legal road. This rule is man v. Evans, I Allen 446; Boston
v.
thought to be more reasonable, since the Richardson, 13 Allen 153.
quesnon always being one of implied
Perhaps all agree, too, that in cases
intention, it is considered more probable of doubtful construction,
the general
that the parties had reference to a Tisi- rule is followed, viz., to the centre of the
ble, apparent, existing road de facto, street: Af1arsh v. Burt, 34 Vt. 289;
rather than to an invisible, recorded line, M3aynardv. W'eeks, 41 Vt. 619.
or boundary not indicated or apparent
In IWhite v. Godfrey, 97 Mass. 472,
by fences, monuments or the like.
the rule was applied to a deed containing
And this is the more obvious where this description: "A certain tract of
the travelled and actual way is wholly land on the
northerly side of S. street,
outside of the limits of the legally located beginning at a point on the line of B.'s
and recorded way. See Sproul v. Foye, land ; thence
by said street, N. 580
55 Me. 162 ; Falls Village Water Powier about one hundred feet to a stake W.,
and
Co. v. Tibbett-, 31 Conn. 165 ; Tebbetts stones at the corner of G.'s land,"
v. Estes, 52 Me. 566. And see Stearns although the stake and
stones were not in
v. Rice, 14 Pick. 411.
the centre of the highway, but at the
This presumption or rule of law, how- side of it. See also Cole v. Htagnes, 22
ever, is generally acknowledged to be Vt. 589; Paul v. Carver, 24 Penn.
prima facie only, and it mar be con- St. 210 ; Adams
v. Saratogaand lW'ashtrolled by the use of sufficient language ington Railroad Co., 11 Barb. 414;
in the deed, clearly showing it was not .John~onv. Anderson, 18 Me. 76.
the intention of the grantor to convey
The fact that the full length of the side

